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How is it that digital investigators are always busy and still never have enough time to
actually dig deep into digital evidence? In this paper we will explore the current imple-
mentation of the digital forensic process and analyze factors that impact the efﬁciency of
this process. Next we explain how in the Netherlands a Digital Forensics as a Service
implementation reduced case backlogs and freed up digital investigators to help detectives
better understand the digital material.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
It is impossible to imagine life today without digital
material. Who does not use a computer, smartphone, tablet
or other digital device nowadays? As a result of the
explosive growth in the number of devices and their use,
the traces produced by the use of these devices have
become more and more important in combating crime.
This growth requires a new understanding of forensic data
analysis: of the manner in which the data on these devices
is processed and of the manner in which the traces
collected by this processing is analyzed.
Since December 2010, in the Netherlands a new
approach is used for processing and investigating the high
volume of seized digital material, viz. Digital Forensics as a
Service (DFaaS). Now, three years later, this approach has
become a standard for hundreds of criminal cases and over
a thousand detectives. This paper describes our approach
and the impact on both the digital and tactical investigative
process.
This paper starts with describing related work in the
next section. In Section Traditional digital investigation
process we describe the traditional digital investigation
process, that we analyze in Section Analysis of thear), harm@holmes.nl
vier Ltd on behalf of DFRWtraditional process. The service model helps to solve a
number of bottlenecks. The DFaaS model is described in
Section Digital Forensics as a Service and analyzed in Sec-
tion Analysis of the Digital Forensics as a Service Process.
Despite the big changes this model causes, there is still
room for improvement. In Section Experience and future
work these improvements are discussed. Section
Conclusions will complete this paper with ﬁnal
conclusions.
Related work
In this paper we apply a digital forensic process model
to the previous and current digital forensic process in the
Netherlands. In the related work we discuss process
models, techniques that can help optimize the current
process and expected developments that have an impact on
the forensic process.Process model
Even though the digital forensic process model is not
standardized, consensus on the abstract level about the
digital forensics process exists. The latest effort by Kohn
et al. (2013) to propose a model contains an overview of
the most signiﬁcant models described over the years. On a
high level, Kohn described six processes: documentation,
preparation, incident, incident response, digital forensicS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
Fig. 1. IDFPM: Digital forensic investigation (Kohn et al., 2013).
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already described the digital investigation process, where
they deﬁned ﬁve groups: readiness, deployment, physical
crime scene investigation, digital crime scene investigation
and review. Casey (2011) summarized the different steps as
preparation, survey/identiﬁcation, preservation and exami-
nation/analysis.
In addition to forensic investigations, eDiscovery exists.
Their processes are very similar. Chisholm (2010) explains
that the primary difference between the two is the scope of
work. For eDiscovery, the Electronic Discovery Reference
Model (EDRM)1 is leading.
This paper focuses on the examination of the digital
traces, deﬁned by different authors as the digital forensic
investigation process (Kohn), the digital crime scene investi-
gation (Carrier) or examination/analysis (Casey). We explain
how the digital forensics process is implemented in the
Netherlands. We do this by using the integrated digital
forensic process model (IDFPM) and terminology as
described by Kohn et al. (2013), but other models can be
applied just as easily. The digital forensic investigation step is
presented in Fig. 1. Other parts of the IDFPM are described
where applicable.
Technical implementations
Multiple next generation forensic analysis systems are
under development or already implemented. These sys-
tems are generally built to automate and speed-up the
indexing of the images, which is a good starting point to set
up Digital Forensics as a Service (DFaaS).
In 2004, Roussev and Richard described a distributed
processing systemmany times faster than AccessData FTK.2
This was a lab setup. Since then FTK 3 and higher support a
total of four so-called workers to automatically process1 http://www.edrm.net/, visited Feb, 2014.
2 http://www.accessdata.com/products/digital-forensics/ftk, visited
Feb, 2014.data in parallel. Research on the automated processing of
seized material was coined in 2006 by Alink et al. (2006).
Ayers (2009) put down the need for such a system and
described the requirements that such a system must,
should or may meet. In 2012, Bhoedjang et al. explained
how the Xiraf system is engineered and in use in the
Netherlands. One of the efforts to build a DFaaS system is
proposed by Lee and Un (2012). They focused on speed and
provided the end-user with a web interface to search
through the data.
A lot of tools exist that support eDiscovery in both law
enforcement and businesses, like ZyLAB eDiscovery OnDe-
mand3 and Symantec eDiscovery Platform,4 powered by
Clearwell.
Expected developments
Some interest has already gone out to speculate onwhat
will happen in the near future. Much of this speculation
stays within the current boundaries and describes im-
provements in tooling and standardization. Richard and
Roussev (2006) and Garﬁnkel (2010) described several
developments they expected to happen. Some of these
developments, like distributed processing, are already in
production, as described before. Garﬁnkel expected a crisis
in digital forensics if no efﬁcientmethod is found to analyze
all data. Some reasons for this are the increase in data,
encryption and proliferation of operating systems and ﬁle
formats.
Traditional digital investigation process
We discuss how the digital forensics process as
described in Section Process model is implemented in the
Netherlands. We do this by using the model and3 http://www.zylab.com/services/ediscovery-ondemand- saas.aspx,
visited Feb, 2014.
4 http://www.symantec.com/ediscovery-platform/, visited Feb, 2014.
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the most recent and contains an overview of the other
relevant models.
Fig. 2 shows the traditional digital investigation process
as practiced in the Netherlands. On the left, the digital
devices are shown, on the right the detectives and analysts
that are interested in information stored on these devices.
Depending on the type of case, a digital investigatormay
be involved sooner or later. Or perhaps not at all. A case can
start in a number of ways: a victim reports a crime, law
enforcement ofﬁcers are called in to a crime scene, an
intrusion detection system reports an intrusion or any of
many other ways. The IDFPM describes this as the incident
process, with a subsequent incident response process. Both
traditional crimes like arson, child abuse and murder, and
cybercrimes like hacking, phishing or denial of service at-
tacks generally have a digital component.
Detectives generally have limited or no training in how
to handle digital devices. They involve a digital investigator
(see Fig. 2) to answer a speciﬁc question related to the
digital devices. This digital investigator has no detailed
knowledge about the case since he was not involved from
the start, did not read any statements and did not attend
any brieﬁngs. He only focuses on the question at hand and
starts with a series of standard tasks. The ﬁrst task is
generally the same: create forensic copies of the digital
devices (collection and authentication). After that,
numerous tools or scripts may be run to recover deleted
ﬁles, carve unallocated space, unpack archives, etcetera.
These standard tasks may be strung together using scripts
(Carrier, 2003–2013). In this process (examination), digital
evidence is made visible and allows for a detective to look
at the information.
A possible next step is to index the data, harvest, to
structure the data in a logical format. Indexing can mean a
number of things, ranging from creating a keyword index,
store recognized timestamps in a database, extract all
metadata to be queried later or a combination of these
methods. To reduce the amount of data to be analyzed, it is
possible to remove known ﬁles, for example by using hash
sets. Hash sets can also be used to identify an incident, but
identiﬁcation may not be necessary or even possible in a lot
of the digital evidence. Identiﬁcation of the incident mayFig. 2. Traditional digitalnot occur until the very end of the investigation, since it is
not always clear if a digital device even contains relevant
trace information.
The IDFPM relies on the identiﬁcation part of the digital
investigation to determine if and what incident occurred. It
may not immediately be clear if a digital device is relevant.
Without identiﬁcation, it is difﬁcult to perform classiﬁca-
tion, organization and comparison. A more common practice
in criminal cases is that a detective formulates questions
based on non-digital case information. These questions are
answered by digital investigators. Generally, an (implicit)
hypothesis forms the basis of these questions. If a question
is asked to retrieve all emails sent on a certain date, the
underlying hypothesis may be that somebody contacted
someone else and email was the preferred means of
communication. A digital investigator can help to formulate
these hypotheses and aid in coming up with more ways to
test a hypothesis.
To answer the question or test the hypothesis, the digital
evidence is analyzed. This may be done in a number of
ways: a keyword search can be performed using an indexed
or live search, the detective may manually search for
Internet history or use a script to search for all chat mes-
sages, a timeline may be created using a forensic tool or
spreadsheet application or other types of investigations
may be performed.
In the current process in the Netherlands, the steps
attribution, evaluation, interpretation and reconstruction are
optional in a digital investigation. If the original question
was “Give me all email communication”, there is not much
interpretation or reconstruction needed. If these steps are
to be taken, results are generally communicated with rele-
vant parties for discussion before continuing with these
steps. Communication may be done in a number of ways.
Common methods are printing out relevant information,
putting results on a portable media or central storage or
upload the results to another system that can correlate
information. Depending on the type of question, this may
lead to a lot of results. The detective has to sieve through
these results before either ﬁnding relevant information or
asking a follow-up question to explain results or reduce the
number of results. If relevant information is found, any
previously skipped steps may be taken to reconstruct theforensics process.
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cycle as described in the IDFPM is more of a tangle than a
straightforward line with an optional cycle.
Eventually, an ofﬁcial report needs to be made that can
for example be presented in court or to management.
Sometimes even at this stage new questions arise, making
it necessary to redo parts of the investigation or perform
additional research. This can be done by either the original
detectives, other detectives, digital investigators or even
counter experts.
Analysis of the traditional process
In general, the process described in the previous section
varies depending on a number of factors. During our years
of experience running a DFaaS with hundreds of cases and
over a thousand users, we identiﬁed a number of factors
with a high impact on efﬁciency. We discuss resource
management, types of questions, required time frame,
collaboration and research, development and sharing
knowledge.
Resource management
Digital investigators are generally responsible for their
investigative environment (infrastructure readiness). This
goes for storage, backups, network, software, security and
many other tasks that come with system administration.
Although it is not their primary task, they may feel (and
possibly be held) responsible if something goes wrong. In
general, they are not equipped to administer the investi-
gative environment. This may lead to security breaches,
failing backup systems, downtime due to incorrect in-
stallations, use of obsolete software and many other things
associated with system administration. This obviously
leads to more time performing system administrative
tasks and less time available to perform digital
investigations.
Digital investigators are also expected to be a Jack of all
trades. Besides system administration, they have a lot of
other tasks. They are needed at crime scenes with non-
trivial digital devices, perform incident response jobs,
create disk images, phone images, memory dumps,
network captures, perform analysis, research unknown ﬁle
formats, and so on. The saying “Jack of all trades, master of
none” is applicable here. While there are deﬁnitely digital
investigators that succeed at combining all the different
roles that are expected of them, they are generally
burdened the most and cannot be everywhere at the same
time. This would not be a bad thing if they succeeded to at
least make the most efﬁcient use of their skills. But is it
really efﬁcient to have someone create disk images while
he could also reverse engineer ﬁle formats?
Questions
In general, three types of questions related to digital
material can be deﬁned. The ﬁrst type is not really a
question, but more of a request. Examples are: “Give me all
communication information”, “Search for the name Pete”
and “I want all information related to drugs”. Theserequests generally result in a lot of work on the part of the
digital investigator, mostly because the requests are
ambiguous. What is deﬁned as communication? Chat,
phone calls, text messages come to mind, but what about
an email message saved in the drafts folder of Gmail (Leger
and Alcindor, 2012)? Does information related to drugs
include contact information, bank account statements and
pictures of expensive cars?
The next type of question is somewhere in the middle. It
is still vague, butmore speciﬁc than the ﬁrst type. Examples
are: “What did the suspect search for?”, “What are the or-
igins of this document?” and “Was the clock running on
time?”. These seem to be questions that may give a more
narrow answer, but still leaves a lot of work to be done for
the digital investigator. How are searches deﬁned? Is this
online, on the local machine, in the email client? And how
does a digital investigator link these results to a speciﬁc
person? There are methods to check if a clock was changed
and if it synchronized, but usually these are vague in-
dications for a longer period of time.
The last type of question is very speciﬁc. The detective
has a hypothesis he wants tested and asks questions like
“With whom did the user chat on March 20th?”, “Were
these pictures taken with this digital camera?” or “Did a
user search online for any of the following medicines?”.
These questions are very speciﬁc and give a good direc-
tion to the digital investigator on what to look for. The
problem is that this pulls the digital investigator into a
tunnel. If a relevant chat message was sent out by the
user on March 19th close to midnight or a picture was
taken with a cell phone that also belongs to the suspect,
the digital investigator may not trigger on these results.
As said before, he generally has no more knowledge about
a case other than what is part of the question. As a result,
he answers the question, thereby potentially missing
crucial information.
Time frame
Another issue with the traditional model is the time
frame. In the ﬁrst couple of days of an investigation, hy-
potheses are formed and leads based on those hypotheses
are followed-up (U.S. Department of Justice, Ofﬁce of Justice
Programs, Ofﬁce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, 1998; Joyce, 2012). Since the results of a digi-
tal investigation usually are not available in the ﬁrst couple
of days, they are not taken into account. The growth in
number of digital investigators is very limited compared to
the growth in number of digital devices, size of digital data
carriers and number of cases with a digital component.
If a digital investigator starts to work on a case, the ﬁrst
couple of steps are generally the same. Create a forensic
copy, recover deleted ﬁles, retrieve Internet history, etc.
This is one of the reasons why digital investigators are
almost always busy. Since the next case is already
screaming for attention, there is practically no time left for
innovation or sharing of knowledge. A digital investigator is
also always busy due to other obligations, which leads to
cases where digital technology is a very important
component, but the case is put on the shelf or not handled
at all.
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Current procedures make it hard to collaborate. If a
digital investigator reports an entire result set, this set is
scattered across multiple detectives. This can be done in a
number of ways, e.g. by number of pages, by person of in-
terest or by task. The detectives can then individually work
through their part. If the set is split so that one detective
looks at contact information, another looks at communi-
cation and a third one looks at the Internet history, there
may be a lot of overlap. If a suspect communicates through
Facebook with one of his contacts there is an overlap, so
who is responsible for looking at these traces? Are they all
three responsible? Or is no-one responsible and is the trace
ignored or overlooked? Another way of splitting up the
work is that each investigator looks at a set of devices, but
there is probably some overlap between devices that is
overlooked. Just like with a printed dossier, splitting up the
evidence based on the size or complexity of the material
makes it harder to keep a bird’s-eye view.
Research, development and sharing knowledge
Digital investigators do case driven research, for
example ﬁnding out the forensic meaning of certain
timestamps. This information is reported to the investiga-
tion team, which uses the information in the case. Of
course, the research results themselves can be applied to
other cases. In general, he can only apply this knowledge if
the digital investigator is associated with a case where the
same question arises. If a similar case is investigated
without the digital investigator knowing about it, either
because he is working another case or because the case is
run in a different part of the country, his knowledge is not
reused: the research is redone or the traces are ignored.
Every nowand then, small tools are built or research results
are blogged to distribute the knowledge to other digital
investigators.
All digital investigators have to keep track of new de-
velopments in their ﬁeld. As said before, the digital in-
vestigators are generally overburdened and do not always
have time to keep their knowledge up to date.
Digital Forensics as a Service
Since December 2010, we use a new service-based
approach for processing and investigating the high vol-
ume of seized digital material: Digital Forensics as a Service
(DFaaS). This service is based on Xiraf, a closed-source, non-
commercial product, developed at the Netherlands Foren-
sics Institute,5 funded by the Dutch Government.
Fig. 3 shows the procedure how forensic cases are
handled using this approach. On the right, there are still
detectives and analysts that have questions related to the
digital material shown on the left. To guarantee forensic
integrity, images are still needed. So as in the traditional
process, the ﬁrst task is to create forensic copies of the5 The authors are employed by the Netherlands Forensics Institute and
work on Xiraf and its successor Hansken.digital devices (collection and authentication). The big
difference is that images are copied to a central storage,
processed (examined) using a standard set of tools,
ranging from tools that extract ﬁle systems, ﬁles and carve
unallocated space, to tools that parse chat logs, Internet
history and mail databases. The results of these tools are
stored (harvested) in a centralized database. After storing
these traces, they can be queried (reduced and analyzed)
using multiple methods: detectives can log on using a
web browser, digital investigators can use the program-
ming interface to run automated tools and analysts may
want to retrieve all information and analyze the results
using data visualization tools, integrate data sources or
build a network of contacts. This makes it possible to
identify, classify, organize and compare the traces within
seconds, based on hypotheses and questions the in-
vestigators have. This can be done at any time during the
investigation.
It is generally difﬁcult for detectives without a digital
background to attribute, evaluate, interpret and reconstruct
digital traces. For these tasks they need to understand how
and why certain traces exist and what events can lead to a
given collection of digital traces. If a relevant trace is found,
it is generally a good idea for a detective to ﬁnd assistance
with a digital investigator that can help the detective
perform these tasks. To do this, good methods of commu-
nication are needed.
Analysis of the Digital Forensics as a Service Process
Some factors that have a high impact on efﬁciency on
the digital forensics process are discussed in Section
Analysis of the traditional process. These same factors are
discussed as they are observed in the DFaaS process.
Resource management
Administration of the DFaaS is performed by a team of
service operators. These operators are system administra-
tors without a digital forensic background. They can upload
images to central storage, index the images, give users ac-
cess to cases and perform other tasks related to system
administration. During indexing, all metadata including
timestamps is extracted from digital devices and a keyword
index is created.
Apart from these operators there are also application
administrators, database administrators, storage adminis-
trators, infrastructure administrators and other system
administrators that are not speciﬁc to the ﬁeld of digital
forensics and are generally needed for other tasks as well.
They have very speciﬁc knowledge about a part of system
administration and can use this knowledge to optimize
systems, prevent data loss, make sure data is protected and
generally make sure the service is available.
By centralizing the software, we make sure that any
spare capacity, both storage and processing power, can be
used by different users. Traditionally, if an investigation in
one part of the country required a lot of storage or pro-
cessing power, these resources were purchased. If another
department had this capacity available andwas not actively
using it, there is no mechanism to share these resources.
Fig. 3. Digital Forensics as a Service.
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can be shared among all investigations.
By centralizing the data, a backup mechanism has to be
implemented only once and security can be arranged
centrally. Moreover, if more than one department had to
perform investigation on the same data, multiple copies of
the data had to be made and distributed and the copies had
to be analyzed multiple times. With a service model, the
only effort required is to grant a detective access to a case,
which can be done in a matter of minutes rather than days
or weeks.Questions
By enabling detectives to directly query the digital
material, they can use their detailed knowledge of a case
or ﬁeld of expertise. They can come up with more hy-
potheses. They can also identify if there are any leads that
may support these or other hypotheses. Because they have
speciﬁc knowledge of a case, like the interests of a suspect
or lingo used in a certain environment, they may trigger
more quickly on results than digital investigators. A de-
tective that wants to know if a person unjustly received
social beneﬁts may look at pictures to see if his suspect
went abroad on vacation. A detective performing a drug
investigation knows dozens of words that can be used to
describe drugs. A detective looking at an alibi of somebody
claiming he was sitting behind his computer at a certain
time may take a couple of hours extra into account to see
if a suspect could have been at a given place at a given
time.
Previously, if detectives asked questions regarding dig-
ital material, they could be either too broad or too narrow.
Now, they are confronted with the results immediately and
adjust their searches accordingly. A keyword search
resulting in hundreds of thousands of results needs addi-
tional ﬁltering before it is useful. If the investigator looks at
a speciﬁc form of communication on a given date about a
speciﬁc subject, the detective may tune any of the ﬁlters to
ﬁnd additional information.Time frame
As described in Section Technical implementations,
with a service model, it makes sense to use a distributed
implementation for harvesting, reducing and analyzing
traces from seized material. For a single department with a
couple dozen of detectives it may not be feasible to
implement a multi-rack system that is idling most of the
time. At a large scale it makes sense to implement a central
system that can by used bymultiple departments.With this
model, it is expected that the system spends less time
idling and more time actually processing data. If digital
material becomes available sooner in the investigation, it
can be used to form hypotheses instead of only using it to
test hypotheses.
Providing digital forensics as a service frees up time
from digital investigators. On the one hand, it reduces the
administrative tasks that are not part of their actual job and
on the other hand the investigative tasks are executed by
detectives, who have much more case knowledge. This
gives the digital investigator the possibility to do more in-
depth (possibly case related) research. Eventually this leads
to a positive spiral upwards that gives a more solid base to
investigations. If this new knowledge is embedded in the
service, the system doubles as a knowledge center. Any
new research results stored this way helps other investi-
gation teams that struggle with the same problems. The
digital material becomes an essential part of any
investigation.
Using the service model allows detectives to work from
their own work station at their own desk. This reduces
overhead time and lowers the threshold to ﬁll in empty
hours. If they run into leads during an investigation, the
digital material can be looked at instantaneously. This
immediately speeds up the investigation.Collaboration
Any forensic analysis system should make it possible to
share progress on a case. This means that when a detective
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the trace so other detectives see the annotation. As shown
in Fig. 3 there are links between detectives, digital in-
vestigators and analysts. If a detective runs into a trace that
he does not understand, it is easy to ask a digital investi-
gator for help. The digital investigator can help by
explaining the meaning of traces, conduct additional
research or assist with writing a statement.
Splitting the data is much easier with a service model
that allows collaboration. Investigative topics are generally
already distributed amongst detectives and if it is possible
to generically search through the data of all devices it is not
needed to split the data according to size or type of device.
It should not matter if an email was read on a mobile
phone, tablet, desktop computer running Windows or a
laptop running OS X. At ﬁrst, a detective wants to know if
an email was sent, later on hewants to know how the email
was sent. These types of queries are supported by Xiraf
(Bhoedjang et al., 2012).
Research, development and sharing knowledge
We expect that digital investigators specialize on one or
more forensic tasks. Currently, three tasks are identiﬁed.
The ﬁrst task is creating forensic images. In order to guar-
antee the integrity of the images, this is a procedure that
needs to be performed. The second task is to interpret re-
sults found by detectives, to explain the meaning of traces
that they found and how they can use the traces in the
actual case. The third task is digging down into the bits and
bytes of the images in order to ﬁnd out speciﬁc information
relevant to the case. This ﬁnal task is often driven by traces
found by detectives that require in-depth digital
investigation.
With DFaaS we have seen a lot of digital forensic de-
partments with backlogs getting back in line with the in-
vestigations. Digital investigations are performed more
efﬁciently and digital investigators are freed to perform
more in-depth research. As described, research performed
d whether it is case driven, technology driven, trend
driven or curiosity driven d can be incorporated in the
DFaaS. The service now serves as a knowledge center. With
over a million apps in just the Apple App Store,6 it is crucial
to share knowledge about how applications can be foren-
sically examined (Garﬁnkel, 2010). It must be easy to add
tools that parse forensic traces left behind by an application
to a centralized environment. New tools become available
to all running investigations, leveraging the results of the
research to more than just the single case, potentially to a
signiﬁcant amount of cases. Even if the results are used in
only one other case, just the fact that the application is
analyzedmay lead to results that would otherwise not have
been obtained.
Experience and future work
Even though the service model ﬁts nicely on digital
forensic investigations and the Xiraf implementation6 http://148apps.biz/app-store-metrics/, visited Feb, 2014.already has proven itself in numerous cases, there is still a
number of possible improvements that enhance the expe-
rience and reduce the lead time for results to be available.
In this section a number of improvements are discussed.
Redundant storage
As mentioned in Section Resource management, in
traditional investigations, if a case needs to be handled by
multiple departments, multiple copies of the data need to
be made and shared. A national investigation where all
departments need to have access to parts of the digital
material results in numerous copies. Not only does this
require a lot of storage, but the logistics in handling this
type of data transport is cumbersome and error prone. In
the current Xiraf procedures, images created of digital de-
vices are copied to a central storage that can be made
available to all departments. Although this optimizes the
amount of storage required and reduces the number of
steps to distribute data, it is still possible to optimize this
step by uploading the images directly to the storage from
the digital devices. This can be done using so-called upload
stations.
Another optimization is that harvesting traces from the
forensic image can start while the device is being imaged.
Even better, the analysis process can inﬂuence the imaging
process by asking for certain blocks of data to become
available with priority. If a hard drive containing an NTFS
ﬁle system is imaged, the master ﬁle table (MFT) is the ﬁrst
thing to analyze. The MFT is generally not stored at the
beginning of the disk. Serving the blocks containing the
MFT ﬁrst, makes it possible to start analyzing it. This may
lengthen the time it takes to image a disk due to random
access, but the total processing time including the analysis
step might shorten.
The result of this optimization is that the authenticate
task as shown in Fig. 1 is temporarily set on hold. This
means that any result obtained is not yet authenticated
until this task is complete.
Indexing performance
As described in Section Related work, a lot of thought
has already gone into parallelizing the indexing process.
The only way so far of parallelizing this process with Xiraf is
by using multiple indexing machines and separately index
images. After the indexing, the results are merged in a
single database, the so called publishing. This process is
cumbersome and requires the index to be fully available
before the database can be queried. Parallelizing the Xiraf
backend requires a full redesign to be able to make it
scalable and query the results while the index is still
running.
Additional query capabilities
Xiraf only allows for indexed queries, which reduces
ﬂexibility. Sometimes a user wants to ask a question that is
not possible by just querying the metadata database. More
complex queries, like matching full keywords, regular ex-
pressions or running additional tools, are difﬁcult to
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implementation, if a new tool is added to the system and
new results are available, these results have to be published
to the database before they can be queried. Adding new
tools is a laborous task and these new tools are not run
automatically for every running case. To apply these tools
on all current cases is a full time job for operators. This
should be optimized so that new tools are automatically
run on all cases and users can create their own data
intensive queries, e.g. regular expression searches or image
processing tools.
Disadvantages of Software as a Service
The same disadvantages for the Software as a Service
model apply to the DFaaS model. Some disadvantages are
latency, dependency on a working Internet connection and
using the stored data in other applications. Any DFaaS
implementation has to make sure these problems are
either acknowledged or tackled.
Security and privacy by design
Xiraf started as a master thesis’ project and grew to a
funded research project (Alink et al., 2006). It was never
meant to be used in real life cases at its current scale. Any
measures taken to implement security and privacy are put
on top of the current implementation. Newer Xiraf releases
incorporate user management, user roles, management
tooling and other measures that are expected in a service
solution. However, if security and privacy are part of the
design process, any code, process or infrastructure takes
these measures into account. In technical design, docu-
mentation, code review and infrastructure design, security
and privacy should be a second nature to anybody involved.
Adding security and privacy in a later stage leaves unex-
pected holes in place. Security and privacymeasures should
make sure that no-one has access to any information they
are not authorized to access, including developers, system
administrators, malicious hackers and cleaners. Especially
since, as described in Section Resource management, sys-
tem administration is no longer done by digital in-
vestigators but by system administrators. This is security
and privacy by design.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the traditional digital foren-
sics investigation process and the digital forensics as a
service (DFaaS) model. We compared the implementations
using the integrated digital forensic process model (IDFPM)
by Kohn et al. (2013).
Digital investigators should not be tasked with system
administrative tasks that are better performed by dedi-
cated system administrators. In the traditional process,
digital investigators are held responsible for their entire
investigation environment (storage, network, software,
security, etc.). Combined with their central role in securing
and analyzing digital evidence this leads to a lot of
administrative overhead and possible security breaches,
failing backup systems and the use of obsolete software,amongst others. Digital investigators are either under-
qualiﬁed or overqualiﬁed for a lot of the tasks they perform
on a daily basis. In the DFaaS setup in the Netherlands,
digital investigators focus on the forensic tasks, i.e. seizing
material and extracting data from it. The data is sent to a
centralized system that automatically extracts traces from
the data and gives digital investigators, detectives and an-
alysts access to the traces. Several administrators execute
domain-speciﬁc tasks related to this service, like applica-
tion administrators, database administrators, storage ad-
ministrators and infrastructure administrators.
It should be possible to use any capacity currently
available within the same organization or even across or-
ganizations to process cases. A lot of departments have
spare storage and processing capacity while other de-
partments may temporarily require this capacity for a large
case that is handled. Traditionally, there is no method to
share this capacity. By centralizing this capacity, de-
partments can use all processing power available to speed
up the processing of digital material. Cross department
investigations have access to one copy of the pre-processed
data, granting access to this data to detectives in another
department can be done in minutes. A disadvantage of the
centralization is that the data has to be made available to
this centralized system. In the Netherlands, we currently
create an extra copy of the data, making it possible to
locally analyze the material as well.
Detectives should be the ones looking at the digital
material. They have knowledge about a case that digital
investigators do not have. In the traditional process, de-
tectives ask digital investigator to provide information.
The lack of critical case-related information makes it hard
if not impossible to determine if traces relate to a speciﬁc
crime or not. As a result, in the traditional process, the
digital investigator is more a harvester of traces than an
analyst. The turnaround time for this can be days or even
weeks. The digital investigator provides the harvested
traces (which may or may not relate to the requested
information) to detectives who subsequently reduce
these traces to a small set of relevant ones. In the service
model, all traces extracted by the service are delivered to
the detectives. They can query the traces, ﬁltering out
irrelevant ones within seconds. If relevant traces are
found, they have direct access to the source material, like
pictures, document and emails. While it is true they run
into problems understanding certain concepts, like
carved ﬁles or the interpretation of a timestamp, they can
be educated to learn this. As described by Bhoedjang
et al., 2012, the beneﬁts of nonexperts investigating dig-
ital material outweigh the risks. Digital investigators can
help detectives by explaining the query results and do
more in-depth investigation on technical details of rele-
vant traces.
Digital material should be made available in the ﬁrst
couple of days in the investigation so it can be used to
form hypotheses. In the traditional process, results from
digital investigations are not available in these ﬁrst
couple of days. As a result, traces found in digital material
are often used for validating instead of forming hypoth-
eses. Providing digital forensics as a service speeds up the
trace harvesting process, making traces available to
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desk. This reduces overhead time and lowers the
threshold to ﬁll in empty hours. If they run into leads
during an investigation, the digital material can be looked
at instantaneously.
Collaboration between detectives and digital in-
vestigators is crucial in understanding digital evidence.
Traditional procedures make it hard to collaborate. Digital
investigators report large result sets that are scattered
across multiple detectives. Just like with a printed dossier,
splitting up the evidence makes it harder to keep a bird’s-
eye view. In general, instead of the material, investigative
topics are distributed among detectives. A service model
makes it possible to analyze all data in the context of a
topic. A trace that is irrelevant to one topic, might be
decisive to another topic in the same case. If a detective
found an interesting trace or a trace that he does not un-
derstand, the service model makes it possible to annotate
the trace. Other detectives or digital investigators have
access to the annotation and can act on it.
Freeing up a digital investigator to perform more in-
depth research will result in a positive spiral upwards. If
more investigative methods are developed, hopefully
turnaround time and time spent for digital investigations
will be reduced. By embedding newly gathered knowledge
in the service, the system is used as a knowledge center.
Any new research results stored this way helps other
investigative teams that struggle with the same problems.
Since December 2010, we implement digital forensics as
a service (DFaaS) in the Netherlands using Xiraf (Alink et al.,
2006; Bhoedjang et al., 2012). Now, three years later, this
approach has become a standard for hundreds of criminal
cases and over a thousand detectives, with great success. At
the moment, we are working on the successor of Xiraf,called Hansken, adding the things we learned from three
years of servicing Dutch law enforcement agencies.
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